stefan collini
Universities feel themselves to be on the defensive all over the world. Where so much discussion of their role turns on questions of funding, it is almost inevitable that the only criterion for the expenditure of ‘public money’ that seems likely to command widespread acceptance is the consumerist one of increased prosperity. This all too easily translates into the philistinism of insisting that the activities carried on in universities need to be justified, perhaps can only be justified, by demonstrating their contribution to the economy. Ultimately, many of the difficulties encountered in making the case for universities derive from a wider climate of unanalysed relativism—I say ‘unanalysed’ because such a position, when made explicit, invariably turns out to be internally inconsistent as well as unliveable. An egalitarian ethos, which is wholly laudable in itself, can generate that kind of ‘who’s to say?’ or ‘that’s just your opinion’ posture which implicitly denies the possibility of reasoned arguments for some things being more worthwhile than others.
This makes it all the more important to emphasize that discussion of what is of interest and importance about universities should not be confined to the topical question of how they are to be funded. This question practically monopolizes public discussion at present, and there is a danger, first, of sliding almost unconsciously into the habit of re-describing intellectual activity entirely in terms of what might be thought to ‘justify public funding’, and second, of becoming unable to throw off a defensive posture, an air of expecting a hostile or unsympathetic reaction to this case. One of the most dispiriting features of the current climate of discussion is the background implication, discernible in the comments of some journalists and politicians, that universities are something of a luxury whose rationale is not likely to survive properly searching scrutiny and that many academics are little better than middle-class welfare-scroungers, indulging their hobbies at public expense. This has been evident in, to take just one example, some of the commentary on the debate over the proposals (in Britain and elsewhere) to assess the quality of research in terms of its economic and social ‘impact’, where it seems simply taken for granted that anyone objecting to these (badly formulated and ill thought-out) proposals must be expressing a complacent sense of entitlement to public funding of their activities whether or not they are of any value. Engagement on these terms is almost bound to be fruitless and is a waste of spirit. We need to start from somewhere else.
One helpful starting point may be to consider what it is that we value and admire about good work in scholarship and science, and then to reflect on the conditions which seem conducive to its achievement. Universities are not, quite, the only places where such work is done, even now, but they unquestionably represent the biggest concentration of such enquiry. It may be that the public perception of universities focuses exclusively on their teaching role, undergraduate teaching above all, seeing them perhaps as bigger and more sophisticated high schools. This role is certainly central, but it is far from being the whole story. Major universities are complex organisms, fostering an extraordinary variety of intellectual, scientific and cultural activity, and the significance and value of much that goes on within them cannot be restricted to a single national framework or to the present generation. They do, of course, have something in common with schools, just as they have something in common with institutes for scientific or medical research, but it is worth remembering that they also have something in common with museums, and galleries and libraries and similar cultural institutions. They have become an important medium—for conserving, understanding, extending and handing on to subsequent generations the intellectual, scientific and artistic heritage of mankind. In thinking about the conditions necessary for their flourishing, we should not, therefore, take too short-term or too purely local a view.
Adopting this wider perspective may also help us become more aware of the limitations of treating economic growth as the overriding test of value. Taking a longer-term view of the history, and indeed the future, of universities encourages us to ask fundamental questions of the goal of ‘contributing to national economic prosperity’. For example, how much prosperity do we need (and who counts as ‘we’)? Is it desirable at any cost? What is it, in its turn, good for? And so on. Any serious attempt to address these questions will inevitably involve appealing to non-economic values. Most people recognize the standing of such values in their own lives—they do not love their pictures or their children in order to generate a profit any more than they admire a beautiful view or a normal wonder because it increases employment—but, as I have suggested, it has become difficult to appeal to such values in a public sphere whose discourse is chiefly framed by the combination of individualism and relativism. Universities are not just good places in which to undertake such fundamental questioning; they also embody an alternative set of values in their very rationale. Attending to these values may help us remember, amid difficult and distracting circumstances, that we are merely custodians for the present generation of a complex intellectual inheritance which we did not create and which is not ours to destroy.
Stefan Collini is author of That’s Offensive! Criticism, Identity, Respect.

